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COMITY OF RELATIONS BETWEEN GOVERNM1ENTS OF
THE SEVERAL STATES AND THE NATIONAL
GOVERNMENT AS AFFECTED BY FEDERAL JUDICIAL REVIEW
JAMEs R. LEwIs*
From the beginning of the National Government to the
present time there has existed continually the many-sided problem of harmonizing the exercise of the sovereign powers of that
government with the similar exercise of such powers by the
several states, in their respective domains. Since no amount of
human wisdom and foresight could mark out precisely the
boundaries of sovereignty to be exercised exclusively by these
separate governments, occupying, as they did and do, the same
geographical domain, in respect to every situation which succeeding events would bring forth, serious conflicts inevitably
arose, and were many times attended with very bitter political
and sectional disputes. Time and experience have brought about
the solution of many of these problems. Nevertheless, very perplexing questions affecting these relations now exist and we may,
with confidence, predict that they will continue to arise, and to
challenge the ingenuity of our ablest statesmen, jurists, and
public administrators.
During the early years of our National Government, little
attempt was made by it to exercise its sovereignty in respect to
commercial and industrial regulation, and its exercise of powers
relative to the basic rights, freedoms, and duties of the individual
citizen was sparing, as this was left largely to the several states.
The principle of supremacy in respect to the powers committed to the government of the Union were set forth in the
Constitution itself in terms so plain and unmistakable, it would
seem, as to be beyond question. But while this was true, and was
rather generally accepted in theory, its application to specific
situations, not completely settled even in the present time, was
then attended with much difficulty and characterized by many
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great struggles in the courts, among the most notable of which
was that of the case of McCdulock v. Maryland," decided by the
Supreme Court in 1819. This Court had, in 1803, in Harblury v.
M1fadison, 2 boldly asserted its power to invalidate a legislative act
of Congress, but it had not previously been called upon to decide
whether it was vested with authority to proceed in a similar
manner when the validity of a state law or judicial decree was
in judicial dispute. The case was argued before the Court for
nine days, with some of the greatest advocates of the time as
the participants, among them, Daniel Webster, William Pinkney,
and William Wirt, on behalf of the government, and Luther
Martin and Joseph Hopkinson, on behalf of the state of Maryland.
In what is regarded by many as his greatest state document, Chief Justice John Marshall, now near the zenith of his
distinguished career, in his opinion for the Court in this case,
formulated a doctrine and laid down a policy for resolving such
conflicts, which has remained the law of the land without important modification to the present time. The essence of the decision
was that on the Supreme Court of the United States did the
Constitution of our country devolve the important duty of peacefully deciding the issues presented by conflicts of the laws of the
Union with those of its members, and in the exercise of this
power and the discharge of this duty in the present case, it must
hold the law of the state of Maryland which attempted to impose
a tax on the Maryland Branch of the Second Bank of the United
States void, as being repugnant to the provisions of that Constitution.
The Court was subjected to a storm of criticism and abuse
for rendering this decision, and there was a popular demand in
Virginia and elsewhere that it be shorn of its power to pass upon
cases to which states were parties. The decision was particularly
obnoxious to those favoring strict construction of the Constitution, because it not only sustained the doctrine of the implied
powers of Congress, but also recognized the binding effect of
an implied limitation upon the states to interfere with the functioning of federal agencies.
With a prescience born of innate wisdom and foresight, as
14

Wheaton (U.S.) 316, 4 L. Ed. 579 (1819).

21 Cranch 137, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803).
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well as experience, the framers of the Constitution must have
foreseen the probable advent of just such disruptive struggles
and controversies as this, when they were led to provide, with
such meticulous care, in the second paragraph of the Sixth Article of the Constitution that "This Constitution, and the laws
of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof;
and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority
of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and
the judges in every State shall be bound thereby ... " Long
before Lincoln had uttered those memorable words, "A nation
divided against itself cannot stand," our political forefathers
had divined the truth of this concept, and had provided, as far as
human wisdom could, against the contingency.
This supreme law of the land, under provisions of Article
III of the Constitution, was to be administered by one Supreme
Court and such inferior courts as the Congress may from time
to time ordain and establish, whose power was made to "extend
to all cases in law and equity arising under this Constitution, the
laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be
made, under their authority; .... to controversies to which the
United States shall be a party; to controversies between two
or more States; . . . .between citizens of different States; between citizens of the same State claiming lands under grants of
different States . . . ."
After the ratification of the Eleventh
Amendment on January 8, 1798, by the terms of which the judicial power of the United States was restricted so as not "to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by citizens of another State, or
by citizens or subjects of any foreign state," subjects of foreign
countries might sue and be sued in the federal courts for the enforcement of rights created by state laws, only if "one of the
United States" was not a party to the suit.
Under the sanction of Article III of the Constitution, Congress during its first session passed, and the President signed, a
comprehensive act, known as the Judiciary Act of 1789. This
act set up the system of federal inferior courts, and provided
extensively for the functioning of the system, and its correlation
with the functioning of the courts of the several States. The
34th section of the act provided, among other things, "that the
laws of the several States, except where the Constitution, treaties

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

or statutes of the United States shall otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common
law in the courts of the United States." These provisions, together with those of the Fourteenth Amendment to the effect
that "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws," which
were added in 1868, constituted the broad framework of the
fundamental law which has so profoundly affected the vast and
complex interrelations between the government of the United
States and those of the several States.
Thus, the questions involving interpretation and application of State laws which have been most frequently before the
federal courts were brought there under one or more of the
following jurisdictional conditions: (1) When a law of a State
was claimed to be repugnant to a provision of the Constitution,
as being inimical to some federal function; (2) when a law
of a State, or the application thereof, was challenged as abridging the privileges or immunities of a citizen of the United States;
(3) when litigations arose between citizens of different States,
or an alien and a citizen of the United States, involving the
enforcement of a legal right created by State law.
The decision in McCulloch v. Maryland settled one Constitutional question of great importance, that is, the proposition
that whenever a State law comes into conflict with the substantive law of the United States made in pursuance of the Constitution, the State law is invalid and must give way, and the
Supreme Court is vested with authority to declare this to be so.
An almost equally important question, intimately affecting relations between the National government and those of the States,
however, was the subject of shifting judicial views for many
years. That question had to do with the extent to which a State
might regulate commercial transactions which, though orginating
within the State, extended beyond the boundary lines thereof,
and to what extent such power was affected by the presence or
absence of regulation of the same subject by the federal government.
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One aspect of this question was disposed of by the Supreme
Court in a leading decision interpreting the commerce clause
of the Constitution, in the case of Gibbons v. Ogden3 , which was
decided in 1824. Chief Justice Marshall's opinion, for a unanimous Court, constitutes another great state document, and is
one of his most respected opinions today. It has been declared
to be "the first great anti-trust decision," and Mfr. Cushman
observes that "It was perhaps the only genuinely popular decision which Marshall ever handed down." In this decision, the
Chief Justice, with penetrating analysis, defined "commerce"
and delineated the powers of the federal government to regulate
it, whenever it was "commerce with foreign nations, and among
the several States," holding that a New York statute regulating
activities of steamboats engaged in interstate commerce between New York and New Jersey was invalid, because it was in
conflict with and restrictive of the federal government's right
to regulate such commerce, a right which had in this case been
previously asserted by that government. The Court did not directly pass upon the question as to whether a state regulation of
such commerce might be valid, so long as Congress failed to
act for the regulation of the particular interstate activities in
question.
Chief Justice Marshall did reject the argument, however, that
the act passed by Congress August 7, 1789, providing that the
operations of river and harbor pilots should be governed by
state laws then in force affirmatively acknowledged a concurrent power in the States to regulate the conduct of such pilots,
and thus implied a recognition by Congress of the right of
States concurrently to regulate commerce with foreign nations
and amongst the States. On the contrary, he said, "The act unquestionably manifests an intention to leave this subject entirely to the states until Congress should think proper to interpose; but the very enactment of such a law indicates an opinion
that it was necessary; that the existing system would not be applicable to the new state of things unless expressly applied to it
by Congress . ..."
The question was more directly dealt with in a later case,
Prigg v. Pemnsylvania,4 decided in 1842, in which the fugitive
9 Wheaton 1, 6 L. Ed. 23 (1824).
16 Peters 539 (1842).
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slave problem was principally involved. Pennsylvania had
previously passed a law to provide machinery whereby lawful
owners of fugitive slaves might establish their ownership and
recover their property, under stipulated conditions, the existence or non-existence of which was to be ascertained by local
tribunals. A case arose in which the local tribunal denied the
right of the claimant to remove a slave from the state, and the
issue of validity of the state enactment was carried , to the
Supreme Court. Justice Story, spealing for the Court, declared
that since the Constitution gave to the federal government the
power to deal with fugitive slaves, that power was thereby withdrawn from the states; that the states could not enforce laws on
the subject, regardless of whether any conflict with federal laws
was involved.
During the same term, the Court handed down another significant decision in which Justice Story again spoke for the Court,
in Swift v. Tyson 5, upholding an action brought in the New
York Federal Court by an indorsee of a bill of exchange against
the acceptor who had been defrauded by the drawer.
One question presented here, the principal question in
the initial action in the local tribunal of the state of New York,
was whether under the circumstances of this case, a pre-existing
debt constituted a valuable consideration in the sense of the
general rule applicable to negotiable instruments. Acceptance
of the bill was in New York, and the local tribunal there held
that a debt of this kind did not constitute such a consideration.
The defendant argued in the Supreme Court that, under the
applicable provisions of the Judiciary Act of 1789, the federal
courts were bound to follow the decisions of the state tribunals
in all cases to which these provisions applied. This contention
was rejected by Justice Story in the following words:
"In order to maintain the argument, it is essential, therefore,
to hold that the word 'laws,' in this section, included within the
scope of its meanings the decisions of the local tribunals....
"In all the various cases, which have hitherto come before us
for decision, this Court have uniformly supposed that the true
interpretation of the 34th section limited its application to state

laws strictly local; that is to say, to the positive statutes of the
state and the construction thereof adopted by the local
tribunals....
16 Peters 1, 10 L. Ed 865 (1842).
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"It becomes necessary for us, therefore, upon the present
occasion, to express our own opinion of the true result of the
commercial law upon the question now before us. And we have
no hesitation in saying that a pre-existing debt does constitute a
valuable consideration in the sense of the general rule already
stated, as applicable to negotiable instruments."

There is much agreement among competent authorities now

to the effect that had Justice Story and the other members of the
Court carefully considered the legislative history of the applicable provisions of the Judiciary Act, a different decision would
have been rendered in this case. Charles Warren in 1923 published significant results of his study of the original Draft Bill
of this Act, and the amendments thereto.6 The data he brings to
light leave little room to doubt that it was the intention of those
who framed and passed this enactment to insure that federal
courts exercising jurisdiction in diversity of citizenship cases
would give effect to the unwritten as well as the statutory laws
of the State, as construed by the local courts.
The case did not attract a great deal of attention at the
time, but it was important, nevertheless, quite out of proportion
to the contemporaneous view of it, because it characterized the
Court's attitude on this important question for almost a hundred
years.
The policy in which the decision was grounded was one
aiming at greater uniformity in the general body of law governing commercial relations, over the entire nation. It was thought
that the State courts would follow the Supreme Court, and uniformity of interpretation was very desirable, since commercial
intercourse among the states and with foreign nations was expanding tremendously and growing in complexity, while each
state seemed determined to establish its own common or unwritten law as well as statutory law with complete disregard for any
notion of harmony with the laws of other states and those of the
Union. The aim of the Court, however, was not realized by this
approach. On the contrary, it tended merely to add one more
element of conflict to the discord.
Eventually, it was necessary for the Supreme Court to consider a much narrower concept as to the permissible limits of
state regulation, in the absence of federal regulation, of transacI Warren, New Light on the History of the FederalJudiciary Act
of 1789 (1923) 37 HARv. L. R. 49.
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tions originating within but extending beyond the boundary
lines of individual states. Such an issue was presented in Peik
v. Chicago and Northwestern Railway Company,7 decided in
1877. As dealt with by Chief Justice Waite in his opinion for
the Court, the question was left obscure, however. Throughout
his tenure, Chief Justice Waite tended to favor broadened regulatory powers of the states. In this case he upheld a Wisconsin
statute regulating railroad operations which were essentially
domestic, but which overlapped the state's boundary lines. He
stated his views thus:
"Until Congress acts in reference to the relations of this
company to interstate commerce, it is certainly within the
power of Wisconsin to regulate its affairs, etc., so far as they
are of domestic concern. With the people of Wisconsin, this
company has domestic relations. Incidentally, these may reach
beyond the state. But certainly, until Congress undertakes to
legislate for those who are without the state, Wisconsin may
provide for those within, even though it may indirectly affect
those without."

A contrary position was taken by the Court a short time
later in Wabash, St. Louis and Pacific Railway Company v.
Illinois,8 decided in 1886, when the Court categorically held
that a state might not regulate even that portion of interstate
commerce which took place wholly within its own borders. This
doctrine was too extreme, however, and has been modified to
permit a greater degree of concurrent power to be exercised by
the States, wherever their exercise of regulatory power is in furtherance of a legitimate domestic function and is not in conflict with the federal government's exclusive power to regulate
interstate commerce. The decision was of much importance,
nevertheless, because it did bring federal regulation of railroads
and other enterprises engaged in interstate commerce much
nearer.
It was not until 1938, when the case of Erie Railroad Company v. Tompkins 9 was decided by the Supreme Court, that the
doctrine laid down in Swift v. Tyson, supra, was set aside and
supplanted by a new concept of far-reaching significance, concerning comity of relations between the States and the National
government, in the exercise of their respective sovereign powers.
'94 U. S. 164 (1877).
118 U. S. 557 (1886).
-304 U. S. 64 (1938).
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This decision brings a radically different concept to bear upon
these relations, as well as a much broader interpretation of the
provisions in the 34th section of the Judiciary Act of 1789. It
goes far beyond simply holding that this provision, contrary to
the interpretation in Swift v. Tyson, requires federal courts
exercising their jurisdiction in diversity of citizenship cases to
apply as their rules of decision the law of the State, unwritten
as well as written.
Speaking through Mr. Justice Brandeis, the Court, while
calling attention to the broadened interpretation of these provisions in the Judiciary Act, concluded that the Constitution
itself required that federal courts in the broad field of general
law accept as their rules of decision the interpretation of state
courts in respect to the statutory and common laws of the various
states. This conclusion was necessitated by the fact that the
Constitution neither conferred nor purported to confer any
power upon the federal courts to declare substantive rules of
common law applicable within a state, and authority not specifically delegated to the federal government was reserved to the
states. Justices Butler and McReynolds, dissenting, protested
sharply but unavailingly against "changing the rule of decision
in force since the foundation of the government," and Justice
Reed thought that the Court should have limited its decision to
the new interpretation of the Judiciary Act without regard to
the constitutional question.
The trend toward greater recognition of the independence
of the states in the administration of their own affairs evidenced
by the decision in the Erie case was much more marked in
subsequent decisions, particularly, Burford v. Sun Oil Company,"' decided in 1943. The essence of the doctrine expounded
in the Burford case is that whenever federal equity courts, in the
exercise of discretionary power to adjudicate questions of law
and fact over which state courts and tribunals have concurrent
jurisdiction, are called upon to consider such issues, they should
exercise their discretion and decline to intervene, where their
intervention is likely to occasion needless delay and conflicts in
the interpretation of law of the state. This doctrine constitutes
a sharp demarcation of the long-unbroken rule that where a
1,319 U. S. 315 (1943).
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federal court has properly obtained jurisdiction in a case on
any ground, such court has the right and power to decide any
and all questions presented in the case, including the local or
state questions."
That this revitalized concept of the Court as to state rights
is not purely transitory is demonstrated by a number of contemporaneous decisions, important among which are the Railroad Commission v. Rowan & Yichols Oil Company cases,' 2 and
Railroad Commission v. Pullman Company.13
Jurisdiction in the Burford case was recognized as being conferred both by diversity of citizenship of the parties, and because
of the plaintiffs' contention that they were being denied due
process of law. The principal issue was whether certain laws
and regulations of the state of Texas, as applied to plaintiffs,
violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
so as to justify a grant of injunctive relief by the federal courts
of equity. A sharply divided Court refused to pass on the Constitutional question, applying the doctrine that such questions
will not be decided if another alternative is open, reversing the
Circuit Court for the Fifth Circuit and sustaining the federal
District Court in its dismissal of the suit.
Approval of the action of the District Court was predicted
upon the doctrine announced in the Erie case, emphasizing
states' rights. Speaking through Mr. Justice Black, the majority
supported their position by the erection of a hierarchy of values
in which individual property rights were subordinated to the
necessities of the public interest. The Court appeared to address
itself but incidentally to the question as to whether plaintiffs'
property rights were being infringed, as claimed, choosing rather
to decide the case on the proposition that a federal court having
jurisdiction, whether by diversity of citizenship of the parties,
or by the presence of federal question, of a suit in equity to enjoin the enforcement of an administrative order of a state commission, may, in its sound discretion, decline to intervene by
granting such relief, if to do so would be prejudicial to the
public interest. It was declared to be in the public interest
" Herkness v. Irion, 278 U. S. 92 (1928); Siler v. L. & N. R. R. Co.,
213 U. S. 175 (1909).

310 U. S. 573 (1940); id.311 U. S. 570 (1941).
312 U. S.496 (1941).
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that federal courts so exercising jurisdiction should use their
discretionary power with proper regard for the independence
of state governments in carrying out their own policy, and
decline to intervene, where, to do so, though affording proper
equitable relief to an injured or threatened property right,
would also tend to thwart the state in- carrying out its policy for
the protection of the public interest.
The philosophy that individual and property rights must
give way to the necessities of the public interests is neither new
nor disturbing. But if our federal courts are henceforth to putsue a line of reasoning which impels them to decline to exercise
a jurisdiction provided for in the Constitution and conferred
upon them with but little contraction since the foundation of
our government, we may justifiably entertain some anxiety as to
where such a policy may lead us, and to what extent it may foreshadow even more disturbing departures of the judicial branch
of the government from the policies which we have hitherto supposed it was the duty of the Congress to determine.
Nor can everyone view without some misgivings, the ultinte conclusion of the Court in this case that the application of
ibis policy not only insures the desirable lessening of conflicts
between the decisions of the federal equity courts and those of
tli state courts, but accomplishes this without substantially impairing or endangering recognizable property rights. On this
point Justice Black declares:
"On the other hand, if the state procedure is followed from
the commission to the State Supreme Court, ultimate review of
the federal questions is full preserved here." (p. 334).
The basic defect in this conclusion is that while the right
of review is indeed preserved, that is not necessarily the equivalent of the preservation of the property right itself. To perceive the significance of this distinction, it is necessary only to
consider the facts operative in the instant case.
The state of Texas, as it constitutionally may do, in the
exercise of its police power for the protection of the public
interest in the conservation of natural resources, promulgated
certain rules limiting the right of plaintiffs and others to drill
oil wells for the purpose of extracting oil from the common
underground reservoir. Plaintiffs, claiming they had complied
with these rules, complained that their property rights were
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impaired by the action of the state commission in subsequently
granting exceptions to these rules, authorizing adjacent property holders to drill wells tapping the common pool at closer
intervals than the rules prescribed for plaintiffs, and that this
would enable the adjoining operators to recover oil which equitably belonged to plaintiffs. Let it be once conceded that the
plaintiffs' claims are just, and it is plain that a right of review
in the federal courts, not presently available but available only
after remedies are exhausted in the state courts, may avail
little or not at all to protect the threatened or impaired rights.
The point is so obvious as to require no further argument in
support of it.
However unimpeachable may be the motives and integrity of
the administrative officers of the state commission, in such a
situation as that presented by the facts in this case, it is almost
inevitable that errors of judgment will result from time to time
in the serious impairment or destruction of property rights,
unless relief through court review and revision of administrative
orders is kept free from obstructions. To say that such questions
are fraught with many complexities and serious difficulties, and,
therefore, should be dealt with exclusively by agencies and tribunals of the state, is to formulate an argument which, it would
seem, should be addressed to Congress, in whose discretion lies the
power to withdraw such questions from the jurisdiction of federal equity courts, if indeed such is deemed to be in the public
interest.
Is not the fact that a federal equity court, upon review of
issues of the instant character, may reach a conclusion which
would differ from the conclusion that would be reached by a
state court considering the same issues, precisely the central
reason which induced the creation of such equity courts? The
classic identification of this fact was given by Chief Justice John
Marshall in Bank of the United States v. Deveaux,14 where he
declared:
"The judicial department was introduced into the American
Constitution, under impressions, and with views, which are too
apparent not to be perceived by all. However true the fact
may be, that the tribunals of the State will administer justice as
impartially as those of the Nation, to parties of every description,
it is not less true that the Constitution itself either entertains
145 Cranch (U. S.) 61, 87 (1809).
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apprehensions on this subject, or views with such indulgence
the possible fears and apprehensions of suitors, that it has established National tribunals for the decision of controversies
between aliens and a citizen, or between citizens of different
States."

If that reasoning was valid when it was brought forth more
than a century ago, is it less valid today?
The majority opinion in the Burford case makes much of the
fact that the issues involved in the controversy presented "as
tough and thorny" a problem as had been dealt with by legislatures anywhere. Difficult the problem certainly was and is, but
to conclude from this fact that its solution depends upon the
state courts having exclusive jurisdiction involves a logical
fallacy, because its implied premise is neither established nor
admissible. How could it be truly said that only state courts
have the requisite skill and experience with which to deal effectively with such problems?
Thus, we are brought to a consideration of the question as to
what will be the most significant features in the years immediately ahead, of the attitude of the courts, particularly that of
the Supreme Court of the United States, in respect to the adjudication of those controversies which intimately affect relations between the government of the Union and those of the
several States. In the leading cases indicative of this attitude
which have been decided by the Supreme Court in recent years,
the individual members of the Court have been so evenly divided and their differences in viewpoint so distinctly drawn that
a definite trend is somewhat difficult to discern. A slight change
in the personnel of the Court could, under these circumstances,
produce a very marked change in the concepts which would
prevail in the adjudication of such questions.
The dominant spirit of the Court today, however, is one of
earnest purpose to afford to the states the broadest possible
scope and autonomy in the solution of their own administrative
and regulatory problems which is consistent with the requirements of that part of the public interest that is committed to
the exclusive protection of the national government. Therefore,
a continuation of the tendency of federal courts having concurrent jurisdiction with state courts in equity suits to vacate their
jurisdiction to allow the state tribunals the right of way, seems
probable. Whether this procedure will eventually find sanction

142
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in a legislative enactment of Congress, and -whether it will prove
as efficacious as its proponents suppose, only time and experience
will determine.
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